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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH .,.;t 
EMIL SCHOCKNMYER, 
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vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and KAISER STEEL COR-
PORATION, 
Deferul,aln.ts • . 
. ;· ~;; 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT :.-;: ' 
KAISER STEEL CORPORATJ9#: 
Appeal from Decision of ,,cp..,i-~ 
The Industrial Commission of UM · 
Emil Schocknmyer 
Moab, Utah 
Attorney for himself 
CLYDE, :MECH!.Klt 
By Frank·J. A.llim , 
Attorneys for De 
Kaiser Steel uorDM!I 
351 South State S 
Salt Lake City, ut.ai· 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EMIL ~CHOCKNMYER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T H E IND US TRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and KAISER STEEL COR-
PORATION, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
KAISI<~H R'l1 EEL CORPORATION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11451 
'l'his is a review, as provided by Section 35-1-83 
F tah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, of an order of 
the Indnstrial Commission of Utah, dated November 
1 :1, l9G8, dmying plaintiff's claim for compensation on 
tlw gronnds that the claim was barred by the statutes 
of limitation and/or foreclosed by his failure to appeal 
horn a final order of the Commission denying his claim. 
1 
DISPOSITION BELOvV 
The Commission denied plaintiff's claim as being 
(1) foreclosed by his failure to appeal from a final order 
denying his claim, and/or (2) barred bv the statute of 
limitations, Section 35-1-99 Ftah Code Annotated, 19:i3. 
RELIEF SOUGH'J' ON APPEAL 
Defendants ask that this Court uphold the findings 
and order of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FAC'rS 
The plaintiff unquestionably sustained lllJUI"Y m 
the course of his employment with the defendant Kaiser 
Stee1 Coq)Oration on June 19, 1958. In view of the fact 
that the claim currentl>- before the court '''as denied 
by the Commis,sion on limitations of actions principles, 
it is not entirely appropriate to review the medical 
aspects of the claim. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's brief 
is devoted entirely to a review of his symptoms and a 
statement of his contention that, whether or not there 
have been technical deficiencies in the presentation of 
his claim from time to time, he now suffers disability h:v· 
reason of industrial accident. It is at least relevant, 
therefore, to point out that all medical prohl0ms i11 con-
nection with J\Ir. Schocknmycr's claim \Yen' refoned to a 
medical panel, constituted as provided by Section 35-1-77 
Utah Code Annotated 1D33, on April 4, 19Gl. The panel 
issued its report on May 12, 1961 (Record pages ():2 
through G6) in which it stated, among others, its con-
clusions that "this panel is unable to relate this appli-
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cant's low back probk•m to his industrial injuries, :::;tudies 
or treatment," and "then~ is no permanent disability as 
a resnlt of these injuries." 
Tlw plaintiff objected to the findings of the medical 
pmwl, and hearing on the objections was held on Oc-
tnher 2, 1961 at which time the plaintiff was given an 
opportnnit~- to t>xarni1w the panel chairman at length 
and to Jffesent any other medical testimony he desired. 
'!'hereafter the reterf'e filed his findings that the plain-
tiff',, IH'ohkms wrrc not the result of industrial injury, 
nnd the Connnil'ision denied the claim. The order was 
dat1·d October 2G, 1961 (Record page 130). No appeal 
from that decision ~was ever taken nor was application 
for rehearing or reviFw filed within the period required 
h~- f-lection 35-1-82 lTtah Code Annotated as it read at 
tlH· time the order denying the claim was issued. 
On August 9, 1962 (Record page 142) a new claim 
seeking compensation for disability related to path-
olot-,ry attrihutablP to injury of June 19, 1958 was filed 
with the Industrial Commission. No formal order was 
c•11t<•rpd in response to that application, but the plain-
ti l'f and his attorneys were advised that the Commission 
had eoncludf'd it had no statutory authority to reopen-
t ht· elaim (Record liage 150). Nevertheless, by reason of 
tl:1· plaintiff',, persistence in asserting his claim through 
t:1P offices of two goyernors and Utah's congressional 
(1(·legati on, the mattPr was scheduled for reconsideration, 
nnd a prP-trial conference was held on August 8, 1968. 
Plaintiff's attorney was then given thirty days within 
\\ 1. ielt to snhmit a nwmorandmn on the jurisdiction and 
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statutes of limitation (1m·stions (Ht>cord vage 1G8). On 
September 10, 1968, plaintiff was advised that no mem-
orandum had been submitted and that, unless one werr 
::mhrnitted within ten days, it would he concluclt•d that 
plaintiff dt>sired to submit tlw matter on the record. 
No memorandum haying been submitted within the ad-
ditional ten days, the Commission entered its ordt>r on 
N ovemher 13, 19G8 denying the plaintiff's claim. It is 
of primary significance in considering the subjt•ct claim 
that there has been no injnry sustained or claimed to 
haye been sustained by the plaintiff since Jnne of 1958. 
It is also note>vorth.\- that plaintiff has been represented 
by competent connsel at ever.\- stagP of the proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY REASON OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 26, 
1961, THE COJVIMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION 
TO CONSIDER THE SUBJECT CLAIM. 
1'he original application in this matter was filed 
on :March 1, 1961 for injnr.\· sustained on June 19, 1958. 
The injury was described as "right shoulder injUl',\' 
resulting into ruptured disc in the back; three crushed 
discs removed." It appears from that application that 
the plaintiff had been paid temporary total disability 
compensation or wages from the date of the allegPd 
injury until Fehrnary 5, 1960, a }Jeriod of approximately 
twentv months. The medical panel concluded that therP 
was no permanent disability from the June 19th injury 
and that any discernable back pathology could not be 
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attrirmted to the injury. 'L'hese 11wdical conclusions were 
adopted as findings of the Commission, and an order 
den~-ing co1111wnsation was entered. No appeal \Vas taken. 
Sincl~ the application for hearing filed March 1, 
l9<il was formally denied after the complete procedure 
for administrative consideration had been followed, any 
question related to that claim must be considered res 
jmlicata. Tlw Comt should require no citation of authori-
t~· for the proposition that, in the absence of a fraud 
11pon the court, no litigant can reopen a claim which 
has once heen formally and finally decided after a statu-
tory IH·riod for seeking n'\'iew has expired. In 1961 and 
until l9G5, the only procedure for precipitating judicial 
n~\-it>w of an order of the Industrial Commission was 
thP filing of a petition for review under Section 35-1-82 
Utah Code Annotated. No petition for review was ever 
filed. 
On August 9, 19G2, the plaintiff filed a separate 
application for hearing. This application alleged dis-
ability resulting from the same injury (the injury of 
.f mw 19, 1958) described in the application of .March l, 
19Gl. Again, on .January 24, 19G3, the plaintiff filed 
an application. This third application for hearing de-
sc.·rihes the same injury of June 19, 1968, and the same 
1mtl10logy, disc degmeration, as the previous two ap~ 
1ilications. We submit that the plaintiff's failure to 
ap1wal from the denial of his original application with-
in the thirty-day period then required by Section 35-1-82 
Utah CodP Annotated 1953, as amended, completely pre-
elndPd the possibility of administrative or judicial re-
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VIPW. 'l'his court so held in State Insurance Fund vs. 
Industrial Commissio11, Gl Utah 579 in 1923, and the 
conrt has not infrequently restated that position. See 
Fcrgnson L'S. I11d1tsfriul Commission, G3 Utah 112, 221 
Pac. 1099; Utah F11el Com pa·11y rs. I 11dustrial Commis-
sion, 73 Ptah 199, 273 Pac. 30G; W oldlH'rg 1;s. Ind1istrial 
Commission, 7 4 Utah 309, 279 Pac. 609. It is obvious that 
an applicant for compensation whose claim has bPen dt'-
nied and who has filed to st>ek administrative or judicial 
revie"· cannot revive the Commission's jurisdiction or 
the Court's jurisdiction b:v the simple expedient of filing 
a new application. The basic llI"oblem presented by all th(' 
applications is whether or not disc pathology which re-
quired surgical correction resulted from an industrial 
accident. This issue was resolved against the applicant 
by a medical panel and by the Commission itself. There 
was no statutory procedure for reconsideration of this 
issu0 once the appeal period has expired. There should 
be no such procedure; the principle of res judicata is 
as valid in the field of worlunen's compensation as in any 
otLer area of lav,,·. 
POINT II 
DISABILITY PERSISTING MORE THAN SIX 
YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF AN INDUSTRIAL 
INJURY CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF AN AWARD 
FOR TEMPORARY TOTAL AND PERMANENT 
PARTIAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION. 
The only injnry plaintiff alleges is an injury of 
.Tune 19, 1958. On January 23, 19G8, in the case of U.S. 
Smelting, illinin9 & Refining Co., vs. Nielse11, 20 Utah 
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:.!cl :.!I 1, ±:)7 P.:..!d rn9, this Comt held that the right to 
rece in• com pernm ti on for temporary total and perrna-
rn·nt partial disability terminates six years after the 
date of the injury. In no event, therefore, could the 
plaintiff here be awarded compensation for any period 
of disahi Ii ty aftt>r .J nne 19, 196±. 
CONCLUSION 
Tlw plaintiff's brief in this matter is essentially a 
l'l'\'i<>w of his symptoms since his injury and an indict-
HH•nt of the attorneys and physicians who have served 
him sinee 1958. The brief does not indicate on what 
tlH·ory the i)laintiff predicates his contention that the 
Co11rn1i ssion or tlw· Conrt have jurisdiction. We have 
attl'llllJtt>d to anticipate the theories which might be ad-
vanced and to demonstrate to the Court that no juris-
didion still exists. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
By Frank J. Allen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kaiser Steel Corporation 
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